Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
Status Quo
- Privacy
if data falls into the wrong hands, end-to-end encryption prevents misuse. (Line/point-to-point encryption only prevents interception of a connection, but not misuse at switching nodes) - Authenticity
signing a message can guarantee the true identity of the sender - Integrity
a checksum can exclude a falsification of the transmitted data
Complex cryptographic public-key algorithms play a central role here. The basic principle is comparatively simple:
- messages/data that have been encrypted with the public key of a requesting user (consumer) before transmission can only be decrypted with the corresponding private key of this user upon receipt. A public key must always be obtained from a trustworthy source
- encrypted messages/data may additionally contain a checksum with which the requesting user can verify whether a manipulation has taken place during the transmission path
-
messages/data that are encrypted with the private key of the sending/requesting user can be verified with the public key of the sending/requesting user when received
- Certificate Authorities(CA) digitally sign and publish the public key of users/applications. The industry standard for monitoring active Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates (espc. for https), is dominated by a handful of major CAs
- Decentralized PKI eliminates dependence on hierarchical PKI managed by centralized CAs., i.e. each entity can serve as its own root authority. The W3C DID Working Group is currently developing a standard for decentralized identifier(DID)
- A Web of Trust uses self-signed certificates from an internal CA in e.g. a company. The distribution takes place in a so-called 'key-signing-party' i.e. an event at which people present their public keys to others in perso
- Blockchain-based PKI is an emerging approach for PKI that uses the blockchain technology. Some cryptocurrencies support the storage of different public key types
UNITED-PAGES
Variable | Example |
privatekey | -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----MIIJQw...-----END PRIVATE KEY----- |
publickey | -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----MIICIjANB...-----END PUBLIC KEY----- |
hashtype | SHA-512 |
keybits | 4096 |
encryptiontype | RSA |
_updated | 2019-07-14T17:08:09+02:00 |
John.Doe@goohoo.com | |
URI | unit://pky/John.Doe@goohoo.com |
URL | https://.../pky/john.doe/goohoo.com |
By default privatekey is read-protected (and there is no must to store it within the UNIT). Knowing the email-address enables web-access on the public-key of the owner e.g.
GET (URL) | https://.../pky/john.doe/goohoo.com |
Response(JSON) | { "publickey":"-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----MIICIjANB...-----END PUBLIC KEY-----", "hashtype:":"SHA-512", "keybits":"4096" , "encryptiontype":"RSA", "_updated":"2019-07-14T17:08:09+02:00" } |
PROVIDER and email-provider are generally identical for a user. Since an email-provider is considered trustworthy (often e.g. passwords are sent via email during registration with a web-portal) a PROVIDER can also be considered trustworthy and the need for further certification of a private-/public-key is eliminated.
The management of a pky-UNIT is (as with all UNITs) under the complete control of the owner/PRODUCER. If a private-key is lost, the key pair can be renewed immediately.
UNITED-PAGES can be used as PKI for e.g. Identity-Access-Management and Digital-Signature.
Especially the pky-UNIT is also used internally to access protected data .
The adjoining example from the UniterPager APP shows that the USER steve@smail. com has protected his mobile phone number from public access. He allows the USERs chris@cmail.com and charly@cmail,com read-access to all contact data, the USER bernd-werner@gmx.net even write-access.
When the WEBSERVER of the PRODUCER (here: smail.com) is different from the WEBSERVER of the requesting CONSUMER (here: cmail.com / gmx.net) the authorization includes a web-request from the WEBSERVER of the PRODUCER on the pky-UNIT of the CONSUMER. Details can be found in the API esp. how the method pays tribute to the complex public encryption.